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Following the Fukushima accident, a special safety inspection was conducted in Korea. The
inspection results show that Korean nuclear power plants have no imminent risk for ex-
pected maximum potential earthquake or coastal flooding. However long- and short-term
safety improvements do need to be implemented. One of the measures to increase the
mitigation capability during a prolonged station blackout (SBO) accident is installing in-
jection flow paths to provide emergency cooling water of external sources using fire en-
gines to the steam generators or reactor cooling systems. This paper illustrates an
evaluation of the effectiveness of external cooling water injection strategies using fire
trucks during a potential extended SBO accident in a 1,000 MWe pressurized water reactor.
With regard to the effectiveness of external cooling water injection strategies using fire
engines, the strategies are judged to be very feasible for a long-term SBO, but are not likely
to be effective for a short-term SBO.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
A state-of-the-art reactor consequence analysis (SOARCA)
project was created by the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (USNRC) to make the best estimates of the offsite
consequences of potential severe reactor accidents for two
pilot plants: the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and the
Surry Power Station [1]. A short-term station blackout (STSBO)
and a long-term station blackout (LTSBO) were identified asPark).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behathemajor groups of accident scenarios for analysis. Both types
of scenarios involve a loss of all alternating current (AC)
power. The risk management features for the SBO are to be
enhanced [2].
In terms of severe accidents caused by an earthquake or
tsunami that are beyond expectation, a special safety in-
spection for operating plants, following the Fukushima acci-
dent, has been conducted by the government of Korea to
verify that nuclear power plants are adequately designed toCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8720respond to extreme accidents [3]. The inspection results show
that Korean nuclear power plants in operation have no
imminent risk for an expected maximum potential earth-
quake or coastal flooding, based on the up-to-date investiga-
tion. However, there is a need to implement long- and short-
term safety improvements in order to secure safety for natu-
ral beyond-design-basis events [4].
One of the measures to increase the mitigation capability
during a prolonged station blackout (SBO) accident is
installing injection flow paths to provide emergency cooling
water of external sources using fire engines on the steam
generators (SGs) or reactor cooling system (RCS). Therefore, it
is necessary to develop some guidelines or strategies to cope
with an extreme severe accident scenario using the newly
installed injection flow paths and fire engines. SOARCA-like
analyses, which are limited to accident progression with the
exception of offsite consequences, were conducted at the
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute for a typical
1,000 MWe pressurized water reactor. In this paper, an
assessment is presented for themitigative effectiveness of the
external cooling water injection strategies using fire engines
during a potential extended SBO accident.
A brief outline of the typical 1,000 MWe pressurized water
reactor design with special reference to the mitigation capa-
bility during an extended SBO accident is provided in this
section. The reactor uses pressurized water with a core ther-
mal output of 2,815 MWth. For secondary heat removal,
feedwater may be supplied to the steam generators using one
of several pumps; for instance, the main feedwater, start-up
feedwater, and auxiliary feedwater (AFW). However, the tur-
bine driven auxiliary feedwater (TD-AFW) pumps can be
credited as a unique means of supplying feedwater during an
SBO event. TD-AFW pumps can provide feedwater until all
station batteries, the capacity of which is a minimum of 4
hours, are depleted. The secondary steam can be removed
through themain steam safety valves (MSSVs) or atmospheric
dump valves (ADVs), which need an operator action in order
to be opened [5]. Themajor design parameters of the reference
plant are summarized in Table 1.Table 1 e Major input modeling parameters of the reference p
Design parameter
Plant type 1,000
Power 2,815
Coolant inventory 2 Steam generators 134 
Reactor coolant system 215 
4 Safety injection tanks 208 
Core Material UO2 86  1
Zircaloy 24  1
Mitigation system against SBO TD-AF
RCS depressurization system 2 train
SG depressurization system 2 atm
Fire engine capacity Water flow into SG 0.0 lpm
Water flow into RCS 1,336
Reactor cavity floor area 62.54
Containment free volume 79,300
Containment failure pressure 1.236
ADV, atmospheric dump valves; PWR, pressurized water reactor; RCS, rea
AFW, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater.The safety injection system of the plants consists of four
safety injection tanks (SITs), and high-pressure, and low
pressure safety injection pumps. The passive SITs automati-
cally discharge into the reactor coolant system if the RCS
pressure decreases below the SIT pressure (4.31 MPa) during
the reactor operation. Because the pressure of the RCS is
maintained above the SIT injection set point in most transient
accident sequences, SIT injection occurs only after depres-
surization of the RCS, vessel breach, or other induced RCS
failure. If secondary heat removal is unavailable owing to
failures in either the AFW system or steam removal system,
core decay heat must be removed using a feed and bleed
operation of RCS to prevent core damage. It is necessary that
only the operator aligns a bleed line of the safety depressur-
ization system (SDS) for the feed and bleed operation because
the high-pressure safety injection pumps will automatically
inject water from the refueling water tank into the RCS once
the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the pumps
for the feed and bleed operation [5].
New injection flow paths for emergency cooling water into
the RCS and SGs were installed as one of the postaction items
after the Fukushima accident. The emergency cooling water
systemconsists of afixedpipeconnected fromtheRCSorSGs to
the outside of the containment. A standby valve is installed on
the pipe. Following the occurrence of an SBO, movable equip-
ment (e.g., a fire truckhose) can be connected to thepipehole at
the opening of the isolation valve. Inmany accidents with very
hazardous work conditions, the inside of the containment
cannot be made accessible or manageable. However, because
the emergency cooling water system can be operated from
outside of the containment, it has the advantages of high
accessibility and maintenance during an accident [6].2. Analysis methodology
The analyses consider several types of mitigation measures,
including those specified in the emergency operatinglant of 1,000MW pressurized water reactor.
Modeling input
MW PWR (2 SG, 2 Hot legs, 4 Cold legs)
MWth
103 kg
103 kg
103 kg
03 kg
03 kg
W with battery power (Minimum battery power: 4 hr)
s of safety depressurization system (62.6 kg/sec/valve at 17.927 MPa)
ospheric dump valves (1 ADV/SG) (106.2 kg/sec/valve at 9.308 MPa)
at 13.53 kg/cm2g (SG pressure) 779 lpm at 1.0 kg/cm2g (SG pressure)
lpm below 13.53 kg/cm2a (RCS pressure)
m2
m3
MPa(g)
ctor cooling system; SBO, station blackout; SG, steam generator; TD-
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8 721procedures, severe accident management guidelines, and the
additional equipment and strategies required by the national
actions taken in Korea after the Fukushima accident. One of
the post-Fukushima actions to cope with a SBO accident is to
supply makeup water using fire trucks into the steam gener-
ator or the RCS.
The mitigative measures for secondary heat removal dur-
ing an SBO accident are atmospheric dump valves and fire
trucks when fixed auxiliary feed water systems are unavai-
lable. Meanwhile, the mitigative measures for the water in-
jection into an RCS are SDSs and fire trucks when fixed
emergency core cooling systems are unavailable. Even though
the SDS still needs AC power, the system is assumed operable
during an SBO scenario, which can be achievable by various
means, for example, through future design improvements.
For a simulation of an SBO, all emergency core cooling
systems, AFW systems except for the TD-AFW, and the
containment spray are assumed to be inoperable. The STSBO
also involves the loss of TD-AFW systems through the loss of
direct current control power or loss of the condensate storage
tank, and therefore proceeds to damage the coremore rapidly.
In the LTSBO, secondary heat removal using atmospheric
dump valves and TD-AFW is assumed to be available during 4
hours initially with battery power.
The analyses were performed using a Modular Accident
Analysis Program (MAAP) computer code version 5.02 [7]. The
MAAP code is a system level computer code capable of con-
ducting integral analyses of potential severe accident pro-
gressions in nuclear power plants, whose main purpose is to
support a Level 2 probabilistic safety assessment or severeFig. 1 e Reactor coolant system nodalization of Modular Acciden
cooling system; SG, steam generator.accident management strategy development. The code allows
operator interventions and incorporates these in a flexible
manner, permitting the user tomodel the operator behavior in
a general way. MAAP simulates an accident transient, spe-
cifically accounting for system events which occur during the
transient, including operator interventions, until a perma-
nently coolable state is achieved or until the containment
pressure boundary has failed and the containment building
has been depressurized. The code includes models for all of
the important phenomena whichmight occur during accident
sequences involving degraded cores. It models thermal-
hydraulics and fission product behavior in the RCS, contain-
ment, and auxiliary buildings. Models are included for engi-
neered safeguard system logic and performance. To establish
that the MAAP5 code is capable of addressing the above pur-
poses and uses, numerous benchmarks have been set, both
with respect to individual models and for the integral
response of reactor systems. These benchmarks provide in-
sights into the code performance and confidence in the ca-
pabilities of MAAP5 to represent individual phenomena as
well as the integral response of reactor systems, including the
influences of operator actions [7].
In MAAP code, the plant system is divided into two re-
gions: the RCS and the containment. The nodalization of the
RCS is not defined by the user, but modeled as fixed nodes.
The nodalization schemes for the regions in the RCS are
shown in Fig. 1, which represent the reference plant-type
design [7]. An important part of this nodalization is that the
downcomer, the lower plenum, the core, and the upper
plenum are divided into four azimuthal nodes to match thet Analysis Program 5.02 for a reference plant. RCS, reactor
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8722number of coolant loops. Hence the downcomer/lower
plenum nodes are 11, 21, 31, and 41/12, 22, 32, and 42. The
azimuthal nodalization allows the modeling of: (1) the
pressure-driven flow; and (2) the turbulent mixing between
adjacent nodes within these subregions of the vessel when
the nodes are water-solid and the pump flow is asymmetric,
such as when one or more coolant pumps are tripped but the
others remain operating. The nodalization of the reactor core
is shown in Fig. 2, where a total of 91 nodes are defined for
this analysis.
The containment is modeled not as a fixed compartmen-
talized structure but as an interconnection of compartments
and flow paths. However, the code is not sensitive to the
number of compartments. Six compartments are defined for
this analysis: (1) reactor cavity; (2) lower compartment
including steam generators; (3) upper compartment; (4)
annular compartment; (5) containment dome compartment;
and (6) emergency core cooling system sump.
Several assumptions were made in the current analysis.
These assumptions are either embedded in the code as
models with input control parameters, or they are assumed in
the present analysis. One of the code models relevant to this
analysis is a hot leg rupturemodel. During a postulated severe
accident, counter-current flow in the hot legs and steam
generators during high-pressure sequences is an important
and uncertain phenomenon. Hot gases coming from the coreFig. 2 e The definition of reactorflow along the top of the hot leg, enter the inlet plenum of the
steam generators, and form a plume that rises toward the SG
tube bundle. This natural circulation phenomenon affects the
heat-up and eventual creep rupture of the hot leg and the
steam generator tubes during high-pressure sequences [7].
The default model of the temperature induced hot leg or SG
tube rupture, which is similar to an independently developed
model [8], was employed in this analysis. RCS components
under stress at high temperatures will undergo irreversible
strain known as material creep. When the strain is large
enough, the component can rupture. Rupture of the RCS
components due to material creep may be predicted by the
application of the Larson-Miller parameter method. The
method may also be applied for cases of time-varying tem-
perature by considering the fractional contribution to rupture
during consecutive intervals. MAAP employs the method and
calculates the steel wall stress-strain creep rupture of the
reactor vessel lower head, the surge line, the hot leg, and the
steam generator tubes.
There are assumptions that the coolingwater injection rate
into the steam generator or RCS by a fire engine is calculated
from the system pressure, which is referred in the utility
document [9]. The injection flow started when the pressure of
the SG secondary side decreases below 13.53 kg/cm2g, and the
flow rate reaches a design flow of 779 lpm at the SG pressure of
1.0 kg/cm2g. And, the flow rate of the cooling water injectioncore node for the analysis.
18
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Fig. 5 eWater level in reactor cooling system for short-
term station blackout base case. SIT, safety injection tanks.3. Analysis results
3.1. Results of STSBO
For an STSBO, one unmitigated base case and two mitigation
strategies were analyzed. There were no mitigative actions in
the unmitigated base case, while two mitigation strategies
included the strategies of the cooling water injection into SGs
or RCS. The calculations were performed over 72 hours from
the accident's initiation.
3.1.1. Unmitigated base case
Figs. 3e6 show plots of the plant time parameter variables for
an STSBO unmitigated base case. Following a simultaneous
loss of off-site and on-site AC power, a reactor scram occurs
immediately due to a loss of power to the control rod drive
mechanism. Since the STSBO involves a loss of TD-AFW sys-
tems through the loss of direct current control power, and has
no other mitigative operator actions or power recovery, the
heat is removed from the secondary side only by the SG water
inventory and MSSVs until the inventory is depleted. Engi-
neered safety features such as high-pressure safety injection
and low-pressure safety injection are not available. The only
water available to cool the core on the primary side is the
initial reactor coolant system inventory.
Following the reactor trip, the pressure in the RCS de-
creases slowly for about 1 hour until the SGs dry out (Fig. 3).
The RCS pressure then increases because of the continued
addition of decay heat to thewater up to the pressurizer safety
valve (PSV) set point (17.2 Ma). PSVs start the cycling of
opening/closing at 1.07 hours (Fig. 4). The inventory of the RCS
is then lost as a water phase or a two-phase mixture through
the PSVs. The water level in the vessel (Fig. 5) continues to
decrease owing to the loss of RCS inventory through the PSVs
after the pressure reaches the PSV set point and the core be-
comes uncovered at 1.99 hours.
The uncovered region of the fuel then heats up, owing to
insufficient water/steam flows, to the onset temperature of0 2 4 6 8 10
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Fig. 3 eWater level in the steam generator for short-term
station blackout base case. SG, steam generator.
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Fig. 6 e Fuel mass in core and corium mass in lower
plenum for short-term station blackout base case. LP,
lower plenum; RV, reactor vessel.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8724the zircaloy-steam reaction, and then quickly rises to the fuel
melting temperature at 3.16 hours (Table 2). As the core
melting spreads, a number of hot gases are generated in the
core. A natural circulation of hot gases through the RCS loop
results in a temperature-induced hot leg rupture. In this case,
the hot leg ruptures at about 3.42 hours, and the inventory of
the safety injection tank is injected as soon as the hot leg has
ruptured. Molten corium relocates into the lower plenum at
5.45 hours and a vessel eventually fails at 7.06 hours (Fig. 6).
When a temperature induced rupture occurs, the vessel fail-
ure is delayed by the injection of the safety injection tank
inventory resulting from the depressurization of the RCS. The
major event occurrence times predicted by the MAAP code
during an STSBO transient are summarized in Tables 2 and 3
(Sequence ID: STU-base).
3.1.2. Mitigated Case 1: Cooling water injection into SGs
Four sensitivity cases were analyzed for an evaluation of the
SG injection strategy depending on the number of opening
ADVs and the opening time of the ADV. The assumptions for
the sensitivity cases and the calculation results of the timing
of key events for the SG injection using fire trucks are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Following the dry out of the SGs, the RCS pressure in-
creases and the PSV is opened at 1.07 hours. If one ADV is
opened at the time of the PSV opening and the coolingwater is
injected through a fire engine, it successfully cools down the
reactor core and the core is not uncovered (Table 2, Sequence
ID: STM1-1ADV-PSV05). When one ADV is opened at 1 hour
after the PSV is opened, the core is uncovered at 2 hours but no
further accident progression, such as a core melt, is predicted
(Table 2, Sequence ID: STM1-1ADV-PSV60). Meanwhile, when
one or two ADVs are opened at 2 hours after the PSV opening
time, then a hot leg rupture and reactor vessel failure are
inevitable (Table 2, Sequence ID: STM1-1ADV-PSV120, STM1-
2ADV-PSV120).
3.1.3. Mitigated Case 2: Cooling water injection into RCS
Four sensitivity cases were analyzed for an evaluation of the
RCS injection strategy depending on the number of SDSs and
the opening time of the SDS. The assumptions for the sensi-
tivity cases and the calculation results of the timing of key
events for the RCS injection using fire trucks are summarized
in Table 3.
As discussed earlier, after the SGs have dried out, the PSV is
opened at 1.07 hours in the STSBO sequence. The calculation
results show that if one SDS starts to depressurize the RCS as
early as the PSV opening time, the system pressure reaches
the point where the fire engine can provide an emergency
coolingwater into the RCS before the hot leg rupture or reactor
vessel failure (Table 3, Sequence ID: STM2-1SDS00). If the RCS
depressurization starts with two SDS systems within 2 hours
after the PSV opening, the temperature induced hot leg
rupture and reactor vessel failure can be prevented (Table 3,
Sequence ID: STM2-2SDS60, STM2-2SDS120).
3.2. Results of LTSBO
For an LTSBO, one unmitigated base case and two mitigation
strategies were analyzed. In an LTSBO, AFW is delivered to
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8 725steam generators using the TD-AFW pump. Decay heat can be
removed from the secondary side by TD-AFW and ADVs
during the 4 hours of battery power supply. There is no miti-
gative action using a fire engine in the unmitigated base case,
while two mitigation strategies include the strategies of the
cooling water injection into steam generators or into RCS
using fire engines. The calculations are performed for 144
hours from the accident initiation.
3.2.1. Unmitigated base case
Figs. 7e10 show plots of the plant time parameter variables for
the LTSBO unmitigated base case. Themajor event occurrence
times predicted by the code are summarized in Tables 4 and 5
(Sequence ID: LTU-base).
Following the reactor trip, the RCS pressure and water
temperature decreases over a four-hour period. During that
time interval, the AFW system supplies water to the SGs
(Fig. 7) and the ADV is opened. The ADV is opened manually
by the operator and the heat transfer rate is controlled to
maintain the RCS water temperature between 563 K and
570 K [10]. At 4 hours into the accident, the TD-AFW pumps0 4 8 12 16 20
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Fig. 7 eWater level in the steam generator for long-term
station blackout base case. SG, steam generator.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8726fail to deliver feed water and the ADV is closed. The RCS
pressure is maintained for 4 hours as the MSSVs are opened
(Fig. 8).
The RCS pressure increases from about 8 hours as the
water level of the SGs decreases (Fig.7), and reaches the PSV
set point (17.24MPa). The PSVs start the open/close cycle at 9.6
hours (Fig. 8, Table 4). The water level in the vessel (Fig. 9)
continues to decrease owing to the loss of RCS inventory
through the PSVs, and the core becomes uncovered (water
level decreases to 6.1m) at 10.2 hours (Table 4). The uncovered
region of the fuel then heats up and quickly rises to the fuel
melting temperature at 12.3 hours (Table 4). A natural circu-
lation of hot gases through the RCS loop results in a temper-
ature induced hot leg rupture at 12.7 hours. The inventory of
four safety injection tanks is injected into the RCS after the hot
leg rupture (Fig. 9). Themolten corematerial relocates into the
lower plenum and the reactor vessel eventually fails at 16.9
hours (Fig. 10, Table 4).0 4 8 12 16 20
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Fig. 10 e Fuel mass in core and corium mass in lower
plenum for long-term station blackout base case. LP, lower
plenum; RV, reactor vessel.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8 7273.2.2. Mitigated Case 1: Cooling water injection into SGs
Three sensitivity caseswere analyzed for the evaluation of the
SG injection strategy depending on the number of opening
ADVs and the opening time of the ADV. The assumptions for
the sensitivity cases and the calculation results of the timing
of key events for the SG injection using fire trucks are sum-
marized in Table 4.
Following the SGs dry out, the RCS pressure increases and
the PSV is opened at 9.6 hours. If one ADV is opened at the
time of PSV opening and the cooling water is injected through
a fire engine, it successfully cools down the reactor core and
the core is not uncovered (Table 4, Sequence ID: LTM1-1ADV-
PSV05). When one ADV is opened at 1 hour after the PSV is
opened, the core is uncovered at 10.3 hours, but no further
accident progression such as a core melt is predicted (Table 4,
Sequence ID: LTM1-1ADV-PSV60). Meanwhile, when one ADV
is opened at 3 hours after the PSV opening time, a hot leg
rupture and reactor vessel failure are inevitable (Table 4,
Sequence ID: LTM1-1ADV-PSV180).
3.2.3. Mitigated Case 2: Cooling water injection into RCS
Four sensitivity cases were analyzed for an evaluation of the
RCS injection strategy depending on the number of SDSs and
their opening time. The assumptions for the sensitivity cases
and the calculation results of the timing of key events for the
RCS injection using fire trucks are summarized in Table 5.
As discussed earlier, after the SGs have dried out, the PSV is
opened at 9.6 hours in an LTSBO sequence. The calculation
results show that if one SDS starts to depressurize the RCS as
early as the PSV opening time, the system pressure reaches
the point where the fire engine can make-up emergency
cooling water into the RCS, before the hot leg rupture or
reactor vessel failure (Table 5, Sequence ID: LTM2-1SDS00). If
the RCS depressurization starts with two SDS systems within
3 hours after the PSV opening, the temperature-induced hot
leg rupture and reactor vessel failure can be prevented (Table
5, Sequence ID: LTM2-2SDS120, LTM2-2SDS180). In the case of
a 5-hour delay of the SDS opening, the reactor vessel is pre-
vented even though the hot leg rupture has already occurred
(Table 5, Sequence ID: LTM2-2SDS300).4. Summary and conclusions
This paper illustrates an evaluation for the effectiveness of
external cooling water injection strategies using fire trucks
during a potential extended SBO. The strategies of emergency
water injection into the SG and RCS are included. In addition,
the STSBO and LTSBO sequences are considered. The time,
when the depressurization with the ADV of the SG secondary
side orwith the PSV of the RCS is initiated, is focused on in this
study, which might be a key feature for a successful strategy
implementation.
The analysis results lead to the summary that the SG or
RCS depressurization should be carried out before about 2
hours from the accident initiation to prevent severe core
damage for the STSBO, and that the depressurization should
be carried out before about 10 hours from the accident initi-
ation to prevent core damage for the LTSBO.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 1 9e7 2 8728The USNRC performed a SOARCA to develop a body of
knowledge regarding the realistic outcomes of severe reactor
accidents. The availability of the external cooling water in-
jection timewas assessed to occur at 3.5 hours [11], the time of
which include the following: (1) initial plant status assess-
ment by operators, (2) attempt to start an emergency diesel
generator manually, (3) manning and operation of the onsite
technical support center and offsite emergency operations
facility, (4) decision-making of the technical support center
and emergency operations facility for the recommendation of
operator actions; and (5) operator's assessment and imple-
mentation of recovery actions.
With regard to the effectiveness of external cooling water
injection strategies using fire engines in an OPR-1000, it can be
concluded from the above discussion, that the strategies are
judged to likely be ineffective for the STSBO. However, the
strategies are very feasible for LRSBO based on the emergency
response time assessed by the SOARCA project. In addition,
the operation of a TD-AFW system is the key important
mitigation measure for the successful implementation of the
strategy.Conflicts of interest
All authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
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